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INTRODUCTION
On March 19, 2018, President Trump announced a new initiative
to Stop Opioid Abuse and Reduce Drug Supply and Demand.1 Dur-
ing his announcement, he explained that accomplishing this initia-
tive would require cutting off the country's supply of illicit drugs by
"prosecut[ing] corrupt or criminally negligent doctors."2 Later, in a
press conference on August 22, 2018, former United States Attorney
General Jeff Sessions explained that the Department of Justice
(DOJ) would enforce the Trump Administration's aggressive ap-
proach by prosecuting physicians who overprescribe prescription
opioids.3 In doing so, he likened overprescribing physicians to drug
dealers and declared that the "Justice Department will use civil and
criminal penalties alike, and . . . will find you, put you in jail, or
make you pay.
4
Due to this aggressive approach, over the past year, physicians
who have exploited their position by purposely overprescribing pre-
scription opioids to their patients for monetary gain have increas-
ingly come within the DOJ's purview.5 As a result, the DOJ's active
role on the forefront of the epidemic has entailed, and will continue
to entail, seeking out and prosecuting corrupt physicians. Still, the
DOJ's role represents only one part of the Trump Administration's
aggressive approach, which will undoubtedly result in positive and
negative effects and which must be improved to ensure it achieves
the Administration's desired outcome.
As such, the first section of this article examines both the back-
ground of the opioid epidemic and the Trump Administration's new
1. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Dep't Takes First-of-Its-Kind-Legal Ac-
tion to Reduce Opioid Over-Prescription (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-
tice- department-takes-first-its -kind-legal-action-reduce-opioid-over-prescription (explaining
that the Trump Administration's new approach entails both prosecuting corrupt physicians
and barring corrupt physicians' ability to write prescriptions through temporary restraining
orders).
2. President Donald J. Trump's Initiative to Stop Opioid Abuse and Reduce Drug Supply
and Demand, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-state-
ments/president-donald-j -trumps-initiative-stop-opioid-abuse-reduce-drug-supply-demand/
[hereinafter Trump's Initiative].
3. Katie Zezima, Justice Department Fights Opioid Abuse on Dark Web and in Doctors'
Offices, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2018, 6:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/us-
tice-department-fights-opioid-abuse-on-dark-web-and-in-doctors-offices/2018/08/22/
9c46d374-a630-1 leS-a656-943eefab5daf story.html?utm term-.64c046d5eeb6.
4. Id.
5. See Em Steck, Attorney General Sessions Blames Corrupt Doctors for Opioid Crisis,




aggressive approach. Then, the second section of this article exam-
ines a few of the positive and negative effects associated with the
Trump Administration's aggressive approach.
The third section of this article examines the Controlled Sub-
stances Act (CSA) and pays special attention to section 841 of the
Act, which is used by prosecutors to criminally charge overprescrib-
ing physicians.6 This section also examines the aggressive ap-
proach's fundamental flaw; namely, prosecutors are required to
show the targeted physician distributed prescription drugs: (1)
knowingly and intentionally; (2) without a legitimate medical pur-
pose; and (3) outside the course of professional practice,7 despite the
fact that "without a legitimate medical purpose" is not defined by
statute or by caselaw and is currently subject to varying meanings.
8
This section continues by discussing the discrepancy regarding the
meaning of "legitimate medical purpose," and it explains that this
discrepancy guarantees inconsistent application of section 841. The
third section of this article concludes with the argument that an
aggressive approach, which seeks to prosecute violators of section
841 more frequently, will result in the approach's negative effects
outweighing its positive effects unless a guiding standard is
adopted.
The fourth section of this article proposes a solution to this prob-
lem in the form of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) en-
forced factor-based regulation specifically designed to supplement
"legitimate medical purpose," which is frequently at the heart of the
nuanced prosecution of overprescribing physicians. This proposed
regulation's factors consist of an author-compiled list of indicators
that a prescription was illegitimately prescribed, which are derived
from cases involving prosecutions of physicians under section 841,
for the purpose of defining when a controlled substance was pre-
scribed for an "illegitimate medical purpose." This section con-
cludes with the following assertion: enactment of the proposed reg-
ulation would assist: (1) medical professionals when determining
6. See generally Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2012).
7. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2019) ("A prescription for a controlled substance.., must
be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual
course ofhis professional practice."); see also United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1187 (4th
Cir. 1995).
8. See, e.g., Alyssa M. McClure, Note, Illegitimate Overprescription: How Burrage v.
United States Is Hindering Punishment of Physicians and Bolstering the Opioid Epidemic,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1747, 1756 (2018) (citing Jeffrey C. Grass, The Medicine Shoppe v.
Loretta Lynch, et al.: Pharmacists and Prescribing Physicians Are Equally Liable, 28
HEALTH LAW. 28, 28-29 (2016)); Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diver-
sion and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST.
Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POLY. 231, 274 (2008).
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which prescribing practices to avoid; (2) prosecutors when deciding
which physicians to prosecute; (3) courts when analyzing the stand-
ard with uniformity; and (4) jurors when applying the standard
without medical expertise.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Opioid Epidemic
An opioid is a prescription painkilling drug that reduces the in-
tensity of pain signals that reach the brain.9 Opioids were tradi-
tionally used to treat acute pain, 10 which is defined as sudden pain
lasting less than six months usually due to serious injury." How-
ever, beginning in the 1990s, opioids became increasingly popular
for treating chronic pain,12 which is defined as pain that lasts over
six months.13 Thus, the opportunity arose for pharmaceutical com-
panies and pain care specialists to market opioids for those dual-
purposes-and they took full advantage of it-through campaigns
against undertreated pain and through reassurances to the medical
community that pain relievers were not addictive.14 As a result,
healthcare practitioners began to prescribe opioids at higher rates
and for longer periods, which led to widespread diversion and inev-
itable misuse.15 Over time, opioids' addictive qualities began to
demonstrate themselves, leading to our current understanding of
their highly addictive qualities-unfortunately, too late.16
The consequences of opioid misuse have been devastating. From
1999 to 2017, more than 700,000 people have died as a result of
opioid overdose, which includes more than 70,000 overdose deaths
9. Misuse of Prescription Drugs, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.dru-
gabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/misuse-prescription-drugs/which-classes-prescrip-
tion-drugs-are-commonly-misused (last updated Dec. 2018).
10. Id.
11. Acute us. Chronic Pain, CLEV. CLINIC, https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/articles/
12051-acute-vs-chronic-pain (last visited Aug. 16, 2019). Examples of acute pain include pain
resulting from surgery or broken bones. Id.
12. Misuse of Prescription Drugs, supra note 9.
13. Acute us. Chronic Pain, supra note 11. Examples of chronic pain include pain result-
ing from arthritis, cancer, and nerve pain. Id.
14. Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/
drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-crisis#one (last updated Jan. 2019); see also Ronald T. Libby,
Treating Doctors as Drug Dealers: The DEA's War on Prescription Painkillers, 545 POL'Y
ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2005).
15. See Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra note 14.
16. Id. (explaining that between 8 to 12% of opioid users develop a dependency and
roughly 21 to 29% of patients prescribed opioids for chronic pain misuse them).
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in 2017 alone.17 These numbers continue to rise; the total number
of opioid overdoses in 2017 was six times higher than the total in
1999.18 At today's current rate of more than 130 opioid-related
deaths daily, overdose deaths are on track to total nearly 800,000
by 2020.19
As a result, legally prescribed drugs, rather than illegal drugs,
are now being considered the predominate "gateway drug," as sta-
tistics demonstrate that nearly 80% of heroin users misused legal
prescription opioids prior to using heroin.20 Thus, the toughest pill
to swallow is that the opioid epidemic "is often not beginning on
street corners; it is starting in doctor's offices and hospitals in every
state in our nation."21 This has meant that the current drug dealer
has a low incentive to involve himself in the trade of street-level
drugs such as heroin or fentanyl, which yield low returns, because
an alternative is distributing legally-prescribed opioids from cor-
rupt physicians, which yield absurdly high returns.
22
B. The Trump Administration's Aggressive Approach as a Solu-
tion to the Opioid Epidemic
Lack of effort does not explain the absence of a solution to this
epidemic. Response efforts were in place long before President
Trump implemented his new approach to curb opioid abuse. These
prior efforts included "patient and prescriber surveillance, reduced
17. Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2018).
18. Id.
19. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Reframing the Opioid Epidemic as a National Emergency,
318 [J]AMA 1539, 1539 (2017); Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 17. This number is
consistently increasing. At the beginning of this research, in September of 2018, this number
totaled 118 opioid-related deaths daily.
20. National Opioids Crisis, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2019).
21. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON COMBATTING DRUG ADDICTION AND THE OPIOID CRISIS
app. 3 at 115 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Fi-
nal Report Draft 11-15-2017.pdf (explaining that there has not been an overall increase in
pain complained of by Americans, yet, the amount of opioids prescribed by physicians has
quadrupled).
22. For example, when prescribed legally by a physician, an 80-milligram tablet of the
well-known prescription opioid OxyContin costs $6. Oxycontin/Oxycodone, CONN.
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.etelearinghouse.org/topies/oxyeontin-oxyeodone/ (last visited
Jan. 26, 2019). At the same dosage, OxyContin's street (illegal) value is $80 per tablet. Id.
However, the financial returns are not drug dealers' only incentive. Prescription opioids are
as addictive as their street-level counterparts, which means that drug dealers can develop
repeat business with either drug. Chicken us. Egg: Which Came First, Heroin or OxyContin
Addiction?, DRUGABUSE.COM, https://drugabuse.com/chicken-vs-egg-what-came-first-the-
heroin-or-oxycontin-addiction/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2019).
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medical prescribing, and counseling and treatment for persons at
risk or already addicted."23 The Trump Administration amplified
and expanded upon prior efforts to combat the epidemic, which is
demonstrated by President Trump's declaration of a state of public
health emergency.24 The gravitas of this new approach is best
demonstrated when considering that prior public health emergen-
cies were declared in response to widespread infectious diseases
such as West Nile virus, HINI influenza, Ebola virus, and Zika vi-
rus.
2 5
In declaring a national emergency, President Trump authorized
public health powers, mobilized resources, and facilitated innova-
tive strategies to curb a rapidly escalating public health crisis.2
Then, on March 19, 2018, the White House Press Secretary released
President Donald J. Trump's Initiative to Stop Opioid Abuse and
Reduce Drug Supply and Demand to the public, which highlighted
three steps necessary to end the opioid epidemic.27 At the center of
this initiative was President Trump's plan to use his newfound pub-
lic health emergency powers to achieve each of the three steps.
These three steps include: (1) reducing drug demand through edu-
cation and preventing over prescription; (2) cutting off the flow of
illicit drugs across United States' borders and within communities;
and (3) saving lives by expanding opportunities for proven treat-
ments for opioid and other drug addictions.28 Below, each of these
three steps will be examined further.
1. Step One
The first step in the Trump Administration's approach to curb
the opioid epidemic entails educating both patients and medical
professionals on the addictive qualities of opioids and the likely ef-
fects which result from addiction. To accomplish this step, first, the
Administration intends to launch national campaigns to build
awareness in patients and to support research and development in
23. Gostin et al., supra note 19, at 1359.
24. Maya Salam, The Opioid Epidemic: A Crisis Years in the Making, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/us/opioid-crisis-public-health-emer-
gency.html.
25. Gostin et al., supra note 19, 1359 (explaining that public health emergencies are typ-
ically the starting point for more large-scale action, such as declaring a national emergency).
26. Id.
27. Trump's Initiative, supra note 2.
28. Id. The premise behind Trump's aggressive approach, i.e., curbing the opioid prob-
lem, has generally been met with approval; see, e.g., Alex Azar, Trump Administration Mak-





opioid-alternative treatment methods, which includes a vaccine to
prevent opioid addiction.29 Second, the Administration seeks to pre-
vent over prescription by educating medical professionals through
a "safer prescribing plan" with the aim of cutting nationwide opioid
prescription fills by one-third by 2021.30
2. Step Two
The second step in the Trump Administration's approach has four
different parts, all of which are designed to curb the opioid epidemic
by cutting off the flow of illicit drugs. Part one aims to keep illegal
drugs, including opioids, heroin, and the like, out of the country by
strengthening the country's borders and by inspecting and identify-
ing suspicious, international packages containing illicit drugs.31
Part two expands the DOJ's reach by creating the Prescription In-
terdiction and Litigation Task Force.32 Creation of this taskforce
instills the DOJ with funds to assign twelve Assistant United
States Attorneys, for a three-year term, to focus solely on investi-
gating and prosecuting health care fraud related to prescription opi-
oids, including "pill mill schemes" and unlawful diversion of pre-
scription opioids by physicians, pharmacies, and opioid manufac-
turers.33 Part three further expands the DOJ's reach by creating
the Joint Criminal Opioid Darknet Enforcement Team.34 Creation
29. Trump's Initiative, supra note 2. The Trump Administration has requested 13 billion
dollars in funding to develop this vaccine. Rick Morgan, Trump's New Opioid Battle Plan
Supports Search for an Addiction Vaccine, CNBC (Mar. 19, 2018, 2:39 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/03/19/trumps-new-opioid-plan-supports-addiction-vaccine.html. While
still in the early stage of its research and evelopment, clinical trials demonstrate that the
vaccine works by curbing the addictive qualities of opioids. Id. Though these trials suggest
it is only effective as a short-term remedy, when coupled with currently existing opioid treat-
ment methods it could play a promising role in the fight to curb opioid addiction. Id.
30. Trump's Initiative, supra note 2.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Announces Opioid
Fraud and Abuse Detection Unit (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-gen-
eral-sessions-announces-opioid-fraud-and-abuse-detection-unit. The Opioid Fraud and
Abuse Detection Unit existed prior to the implementation of the Trump Administration's new
approach; this new approach formalized the unit and expanded its funding. See id. The term
'pill mill" is commonly used to describe an opioid pain treatment center that churns out in-
ordinately high amounts of pain medication for illegitimate purposes. Jeffrey A. Singer, Drug
Prohibition and Third-Party Payers Created the "Pill Mills", CATO INST. (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/drug-prohibition-third-party-payers-created-
pill-mills.
34. Trump's Initiative, supra note 2. The darknet "is a hidden portion of the internet
that can only be accessed using special software." Saheli Roy Choudhury & Arjun Kharpal,
The Deep Web' May Be 500 Times Bigger Than the Normal Web. Its Uses Go Well Beyond
Buying Drugs, CNBC (Sept. 6, 2018, 1:53 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/06/beyond-the-
valley-understanding-the-mysteries-of-the-dark-web.html. Darknet users are anonymous
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of this Team merges the Federal Bureau of Investigation's and
DOJ's efforts in investigating and prosecuting illegal and anony-
mous online opioid sales.35 Part four calls for the DOJ to impose




The third step in the Trump Administration's approach to curb
the opioid epidemic entails immediately aiding those struggling
with addiction and stopping reoccurring addiction. To accomplish
this step, first, the Administration has called for increased access
to naloxone, a lifesaving medication used to reverse overdoses, to
first responders so that opioid overdose deaths are reduced.37 Sec-
ond, the Administration has called for legislative changes to laws
which prohibit Medicaid reimbursement to addiction treatment
centers that service more than sixteen patients, increased access to
addiction treatment in hard-hit areas for addicts and veterans, and
scaled up support for State, Tribal, and local drug courts.
38
II. EFFECTS OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S AGGRESSIVE
APPROACH
This section analyzes the positive and negative effects of the
Trump Administration's aggressive approach. Specifically, it ana-
lyzes the effects that stem from step two, part two of the aggressive
approach-increased prosecution of overprescribing physicians.
and are therefore able to bypass typical internet censorship, making the darknet the perfect
avenue for sales of illegal drugs and contraband. Id.
35. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Announces New
Tool to Fight Online Drug Trafficking (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attor-
ney-general-sessions-announces-new-tool-fight-online-drug-trafficking.
36. Trump's Initiative, supra note 2.
37. Id.
38. Id. "Drug courts are specialized court docket programs that target criminal defend-
ants and offenders, juvenile offenders, and parents with pending child welfare cases who
have alcohol and other drug dependency problems." Overview of Drug Courts, NAT'L INST.




"The majority of people who abuse, misuse, or overdose on pre-
scription opioids are not the patients for whom they are pre-
scribed."
39
The Trump Administration seeks to cut off the illicit supply of
opioids being diverted to the streets by prosecuting corrupt physi-
clans. The goal is obvious: fewer drugs prescribed illegitimately
means fewer drugs on the streets, thereby presenting fewer oppor-
tunities for abuse and overdose. Two examples of DOJ prosecu-
tions, the first a criminal action and the second a civil action,
demonstrate how this approach stops drug diversion permanently
and swiftly.
On June 28, 2018, the DOJ charged 601 individuals in the largest
ever health-care fraud action.40 The action included seventy-six
physicians charged with illegally prescribing and distributing opi-
oids, resulted in eighty-four opioid-related cases, and involved thir-
teen million illegal doses of opioids.41 Thus, the DOJ stopped phy-
sicians from prescribing massive quantities of opioids that could
have proven deadly by prosecuting these bona fide drug dealers
through criminal action.
On August 22, 2018, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions an-
nounced a new strategy to stop overprescribing physicians in the
form of civil injunctions, which are designed to immediately block
physicians' rights to prescribe medicine.42 This strategy was imple-
mented against two Ohio physicians, described in court by the pros-
ecuting United States Attorneys as "automatic prescription ma-
chines to anyone who solicited."43 One of the physicians was found
to be corrupt after he wrote a confidential informant, whom he had
just met for the first time, a prescription for twenty pain pills. 44 The
39. Kelly K. Dineen, Addressing Prescription Opioid Abuse Concerns in Context: Syn-
chronizing Policy Solutions to Multiple Complex Public Health Problems, 40 L. & PSYCHOL.
REV. 1, 10 (2016) (emphasis added).
40. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Health Care Fraud Takedown Results in
Charges Against 601 Individuals Responsible for over $2 Billion in Fraud Losses (June 28,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/national-health-care-fraud-takedown-results-charges-
against-60 1-individuals-responsible-over.
41. Id. This example serves to demonstrate the influence just a few physicians can have
on the illicit drug supply. Here, only 76 physicians were able to divert 13 million doses of
illegally prescribed opioids.
42. See Mark Gillispie, AG Jeff Sessions Addresses US Opioid Epidemic in Cleveland,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 22, 2018, 3:47 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/ohio/articles/2018-08-22/ag-j eff-sessions-addresses-us-opioid-epidemic-in-cleveland.




physician described that amount as one that would not raise red
flags.45 The second physician was found to be corrupt after he pre-
scribed an undercover agent powerful drugs following a cursory
medical examination, a trademark sign a physician is corrupt.
4
These civil injunctions served as temporary restraining orders
against these physicians and are becoming the new norm under the
Trump Administration.4 7 In cases such as these, civil injunctions
immediately stop illicit opioid diversion by revoking the physician's
license and by blocking the physician's ability to write prescriptions
until criminal charges are brought.48
B. Negative Effects
'fP]rescription drugs and/or controlled substances, when pre-
scribed for a legitimate medical purpose and in the course of
ordinary patient care, do effectively manage and treat severe
pain, which improves the quality of life for many patients."49
Negative effects are likely to follow in a hostile environment
where physicians are being carefully watched and where prosecu-
tions for improper prescription practices are rising.50 In fact, phy-
sician prosecutions have already resulted in three negative trends:
the first pertaining to reduced legitimate prescriptions by physi-
clans, the second pertaining to reduced treatment of patient pain,
and the third pertaining to reduced trust in the physician-patient
relationship. For reasons explained below, these trends will inevi-
tably surge under the Trump Administration's more aggressive ap-
proach.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (llth Cir. 2008) (finding
a physician to be corrupt after he routinely prescribed opioids based on cursory examinations
because he: (1) performed no or very minimal physical examinations, (2) failed to obtain old
or prior medical records from his patients, and (3) failed to run diagnostic tests).
47. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Att'y Gen. Sessions Makes Multiple Major An-
nouncements as the Justice Dep't Continues to Combat the Opioid Crisis (Aug. 22, 2018),
https://www.justice. gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-makes-multiple-major-an-
nouncements-justice-department-continues.
48. Id. (explaining that once such a civil injunction is enforced, the targeted physician
immediately loses the ability to prescribe opioids even before formal criminal prosecution
commences).
49. Danielle M. Nunziato, Note, Preventing Prescription Drug Overdose in the Twenty-
First Century: Is the Controlled Substances Act Enough?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1261, 1270
(2010) (emphasis added).
50. The Trump Administration would likely argue that such aggressive prosecutions are
justified and typically successful because, as history has shown, they "generally involve facts
where the physician's conduct is not merely of questionable legality, but instead is a glaring
example of illegal activity." Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 71
Fed. Reg. 52716, 52717 (Sept. 6, 2006).
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Within the last few years, guidelines for prescribing opioids for
chronic pain have been published and "physicians have been ad-
vised to severely restrict the use of opioids for pain control."51 Phy-
sicians who disregard this advice and overprescribe are subject to
an increased risk of "investigation, license revocation, sanctions,
jail time, and a shattered reputation in the medical community."
52
It is not hard to imagine that this potential liability could correlate
to risk-adverse prescription practices.53 For example, physicians
are currently refusing to prescribe opioids to patients with acute
pain and refusing to even see patients with chronic pain alto-
gether.54 Such risk-adverse practices are a problem, as the harm
caused by untreated pain can outweigh the risks associated with
potential abuse.
55
Patients increasingly complain of untreated pain, which gener-
ally correlates to a lower quality of life, and specifically correlates
to higher levels of depression and suicide.5 Greater scrutiny on
51. Mark A. Rothstein, Ethical Responsibilities of Physicians in the Opioid Crisis, 45 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 682, 684 (2017). Advisement came from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), which is one of the key operating components of the Department of Health
and Human Services. CDC Organization, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/cio.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2019). The CDC's main
purpose is decreasing health, safety, and security threats in the United States, which it ac-
complishes by conducting research and providing health-related information to medical pro-
fessionals. Id.
52. Ashley Bruce Trehan, Note, Fear of Prescribing: How the DEA Is Infringing on Pa-
tients'Right to Palliative Care, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 961, 981 (2007).
53. See McClure, supra note 8, at 1752. "[L]egal and academic professions have been
reluctant to advocate criminal liability for physicians for improper prescribing, 'fearing that
such liability would create a chilling effect: physicians would refrain from properly treating
patients who legitimately needed certain prescription medications out of fear of criminal
sanctions." Id. (quoting Michael C. Barnes & Stacy L. Sklaver, Active Verification and Vig-
ilance: A Method to Avoid Civil and Criminal Liability When Prescribing Controlled Sub-
stances, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 93, 95 (2013)).
54. Anita Harper Poe, Prescription Drug Abuse: What Does America's Painkiller Abuse
Epidemic Mean for Attorneys And What Can Be Done?, MONT. LAW., Oct. 2016, at 26, 28.
This failure by physicians to prescribe opioids for acute pain is contrary to the original motive
behind opioid-based pain relief therapy.
55. FDA Drug Safety Communication: FDA Urges Caution About Withholding Opioid
Addiction Medications from Patients Taking Benzodiazepines or CNS Depressants: Careful
Medication Management Can Reduce Risks, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda. gov/
Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm575307.htm (last updated Sept. 26, 2017) (explaining situations in
which failing to treat patients and leaving them to fend for themselves will lead to severe
outcomes). In fact, a nationwide survey by Fox News found that 34% of physicians believe
prescription painkiller reduction hurts patients. Happening Now: Are Doctors Harming Pa-
tients by Cutting Back on Prescription Painkillers?, Fox NEWS (Jan. 6, 2017), https://
www.foxnews.com/health/happening-now-are-doctors-harming-patients-by-cutting-back-on-
prescription-painkillers.
56. Addiction and Suicide, ADDICTION CTR., https://www.addictioncenter.com/addic-
tion/addiction-and-suicide/ (last updated July 10, 2019) (explaining the "very close and inter-
connected relationship" between addiction, depression, and suicide, including the fact that
"[m]ore than 90% of people who fall victim to suicide suffer from depression, have a substance
abuse disorder, or both").
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opioid prescription practices has meant chronic pain sufferers, such
as cancer patients,57 have been either tapered off or cut off entirely
from their typical pain pill dosage.58
The issuance of fewer prescriptions and higher rates of untreated
pain have resulted in a layer of distrust befalling the physician-pa-
tient relationship and have caused the "relationship" to become ad-
versarial.59 Some patients now perceive that their physicians be-
lieve they are "drug seeking."6 30 For example, a patient who began
receiving pain treatment to control chronic arthritis explained her
experience: "[y]ou go in to fill your prescription and you're treated
like a second-class citizen ... like you're a drug addict."11 The prob-
lem with this trend is that trust is essential to the clinical relation-
ship and therefore essential to successful patient rehabilitation.
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Absent this trust, patients will begin to feel "pushed to the side" and
will be more likely to turn to alternative street drugs such as heroin
to cure the unrelenting pain. 3 Yet, one mistake by a physician is
enough to trigger an investigation into the physician's prescribing
57. See Sarah Vander Schaaf, Amid the Opioid Crisis, Some Seriously Ill People Risk
Losing Drugs They Depend on, WASH. POST (July 14, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/national/health-science/amid-the-opioid-crisis-some-seriously-ill-people-risk-
losing-drugs-they-depend-on/2018/07/13/65850640-730d- 1 le8-805c-4b670l9fcfe4_story
.htmlnoredirect-on&utm term-.7f62967d8048. For example, prior to the implementation
of this aggressive approach, Julie Anne Feinstein (Feinstein), a seventy-five-year-old cancer
survivor patient, had been prescribed opioids for seven years to treat the chronic pain that
plagued her. Id. However, this all changed after the approach's implementation, as her
primary-care physician otified her that, because of the risk involved, he could no longer
prescribe her opioids for her chronic pain. Id. According to Feinstein, what followed were
'six months 'of hell' pain, worry and several rejections"-before she found a pain specialist
who would accept her as a patient. Id.
58. See Brianna Ehley, How the Opioid Crackdown Is Backfiring, POLITICO (Aug. 28,
2018, 5:06 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/28/how-the-opioid-crackdown-is-
backfiring-752183. Take, for example, the following experience of former law enforcement
officer, Jon Fowlkes (Fowlkes). Fowlkes endured excruciating back pain following a motor-
cycle crash nearly twenty years ago. Id. He was consistently prescribed opioids twice-a-day
to tolerate the pain. Id. However, years of twice-a-day pain medication were abruptly halted
by Fowlkes's physician due to increased prescription regulation and scrutiny by the DOJ. Id.
Without his pain medicine, relentless pain led Fowlkes to begin having suicidal thoughts,
which went as far as a conversation with his wife about the gun he would use to end his life.
Id.
59. See Daniel Z. Buchman et al., You Present Like a Drug Addict: Patient and Clinician
Perspectives on Trust and Trustworthiness in Chronic Pain Management, 17 PAIN MED. 1394,
1403 (2016).
60. Ehley, supra note 58.
61. Id.
62. Buchman et al., supra note 59, at 1403.
63. Ehley, supra note 58; Sarah Karlin-Smith & Brianna Ehley, 5 Unintended Conse-
quences of Addressing the Opioid Crisis, POLITICO (May 8, 2018, 5:07 AM), https://www.po-
litico.com/story/2018/05/08/opioid-epidemic-consequences-502619 (cautioning that as many
as ten million individuals suffering from chronic pain are likely to be affected and potentially
dropped by their physicians because of the added scrutiny on opioid prescription).
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practices, which "alone can be devastating. [And,] a finding of lia-
bility can trigger a cascade of consequences that make it impossible
to practice medicine."6 4 Consequently, physicians have found them-
selves in as close to a "lose-lose" scenario as one can find.
6 5
III. THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
The CSA was crafted in response to a growing drug problem,
which originated in the 1970s, and was designed to place re-
strictions on the use and distribution of prescription opioids and
narcotics.6 This section begins with a brief discussion of the CSA's
background. It proceeds with an analysis of the CSA's fundamental
flaw: it is ineffective when used by prosecutors as a tool to restrict
the illicit distribution of opioids in the context of overprescribing
physicians.
A. Background
To enforce the CSA, Congress created the DEA, a federal law en-
forcement agency under the DOJ, to investigate and prepare the
prosecution of CSA violators. 7 The DEA has carried out the CSA's
restrictions by tracking all individuals and entities that distribute
prescription opioids and by placing prescription drugs, referred to
by the CSA as "controlled substances," into one of five schedules
based on their medical utility, potential for abuse, potential for
64. Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Can Physi-
cians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM.
J.L. & MED. 7, 22 (2016). The implications such a prosecution can have on a physician's life
are best embodied by events following a 2017 trial involving Dr. Charles Szyman (Szyman).
Szyman, a Wisconsin pain management physician, was indicted on nineteen counts of over-
prescribing opioid medication. Alisa M. Schafer, Dr. Charles Szyman Trial: Jury Finds Ex-
Manitowoc Doctor Not Guilty of Drug Trafficking, HERALD TIMES REP. (Nov. 17, 2017, 4:53
PM), https://www.htrnews.com/story/news/2017/11/17/dr-charles-szyman-trial-jury-finds-ex-
manitowoc-doctor-not-guilty-drug-trafficking-overdose-deaths/8727 10001/ [hereinafter Szy-
man Trial]. The jury in this case was tasked with determining whether Szyman's high-dose
opioid prescriptions were written for a "legitimate medical purpose," even if signs indicated
his patients were addicted to, abusing, and diverting the opioids. Id. Following a five-day
trial, the jury found that Szyman had prescribed the opioids for a "legitimate medical pur-
pose" and acquitted him of the charges. Id. Tragically, Szyman passed away one year after
his acquittal. Alisa M. Schafer, Former Manitowoc Doctor Charles Szyman Dies at 66,
HERALD TIMES REP. (Feb. 21, 2018, 11:47 AM), https://www.htrnews.com/story/news/2018/
02/2 1/dr-charles-szyman-dies-ex-manitowoc-doctor-accused-over-prescribing-pain-
meds/359201002/. His obituary indicated that "in lieu of flowers, memorials would be appre-
ciated to the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention." Id.
65. See generally Szyman Trial, supra note 64.
66. Nathan Guevremont et al., Physician Autonomy and the Opioid Crisis, 46 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 203, 206 (2018) (describing the CSA's historical background).
67. DEA Mission Statement, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.,
https://www.dea.gov/mission (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
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physical or psychological dependence, and probability for safe use
under medical supervision.8 The prescription drugs contained
within each schedule are categorized by the DEA, ranging from sub-
stances which have highly addictive qualities and thus require high
levels of control, to substances that have lesser addictive qualities
and thus require lesser levels of control.6 9
The CSA also imposes additional requirements on the prescribing
of controlled substances, including: (1) medical practitioners must
register with the DEA prior to prescribing any controlled sub-
stances;70 and (2) controlled substances may only be prescribed by
registered medical practitioners "for a legitimate medical purpose.
• . in the usual course of [their] professional practice."71 Failure to
adhere to the CSA's requirements is a federal crime.72 As a result,
prescribing practices which violate the CSA demonstrate the viola-
tor was "acting as a drug 'pusher' rather than as a physician.
7 3
However, such a determination-whether a physician prescribed a
controlled substance for a "legitimate medical purpose"-has
proven to be an elusive concept for physicians, prosecutors, and
courts to grasp.
68. See CSA, 21 U.S.C. § 827(a) (2012); see also id. § 812(b).
69. See id. § 812(b). For example, Schedule I drugs, such as heroin or ecstasy, are con-
sidered to have a "high potential for abuse[,]' are not considered to have any medical use,
and are thus not to be prescribed. Controlled Substance Schedules, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE,
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). In contrast,
Schedule V drugs, such as low dose Robitussin or codeine, are freely prescribed as they have
many "accepted medical use[s]" and a low potential for abuse. Id. The DEA makes schedul-
ing decisions based upon the advice and recommendations of the Department of Health and
Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, and National Institute on Drug Abuse.
BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34635, THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT:
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 1-2 (2012).
70. 21 U.S.C. § 822(a)(2) (explaining that every person who "proposes to dispense" a con-
trolled substance is required to register with the United States Attorney General); 21 C.F.R.
§ 1301.1 l(a) (2019) ("Every person who manufactures, distributes, dispenses, imports, or ex-
ports any controlled substance or who proposes to [do so] shall obtain a registration . . .")
"Practitioners may register [to prescribe] any or all schedules except Schedule I." Douglas J.
Behr, Prescription Drug Control Under the Federal Controlled Substances Act: A Web of Ad-
ministrative, Civil, and Criminal Law Controls, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 41, 54
(1994).
71. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a).
72. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (stating that it is a federal crime for any non-registered individ-
ual to "knowingly or intentionally.., manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance"); see also United
States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975) (interpreting the CSA and holding that physicians
are subject to criminal liability "when their activities fall outside the usual course of profes-
sional practice"). Actions in violation of the CSA subject medical practitioners to potential
'suspension and/or revocation of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) licenses, signifi-
cant monetary fines, and probationary periods." Sigrid Fry-Revere & Elizabeth K. Do, A
Chronic Problem: Pain Management of Non-Cancer Pain in America, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L.
& POL'Y 193, 201 (2013).
73. Moore, 423 U.S. at 138.
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B. Fundamental Flaw
To bring a criminal action against an overprescribing physician,
a prosecutor must demonstrate that: (1) the physician knowingly
and intentionally furnished a prescription for a controlled sub-
stance; (2) the physician's behavior served no "legitimate medical
purpose;" and (3) the physician acted outside of "the usual course of
medical practice."74 However, the standard found in factor two, "le-
gitimate medical purpose," is not defined by the CSA, meaning it is
often at issue in the prosecution of overprescribing physicians.
The lack of a definition for such a standard is largely based upon
a deep-rooted conflict that focuses on the need for balance between
two adversarial parties: law enforcement and medical profession-
als.75 "Efforts by prosecutors and regulators to determine what is a
'legitimate medical purpose' [have been repeatedly characterized as
attempts] to define the standard of acceptable care by medical pro-
fessionals and invade physicians' exclusive turf[,] [thereby] seri-
ously [threatening physicians'] professional integrity."76 For that
precise reason, Congress chose not to delegate authority to create,
and thereby define, physicians' federal standards of care to the At-
torney General or DEA, but left it to the states to create such stand-
ards.77 Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has inter-
preted the CSA's statutory scheme as prohibiting any federal at-
tempt to define "legitimate medical purpose."78 Instead, the courts
analyze issues concerning the standard on a case-by-case basis and
rely on state-specific medical licensing standards.79
Take, for example, a recent analysis of the issue by the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which considered
74. See United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1187 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States
v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132, 1141 (4th Cir. 1994)).
75. This conflict stems from the contrasting goals of law enforcement and physicians.
See Hoffmann, supra note 8, at 257. Law enforcement officers aim to improve public safety
by holding corrupt physicians accountable, while medical professionals aim to improve pa-
tient health by prescribing treatment based upon their expertise. Id.
76. Id.
77. See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (indicating that state law shall regulate in areas that Congress
has not explicitly sought to occupy, such as medical licensing standards). Each state's med-
ical licensing board sets its own licensing standards, which define professional standards of
care. Frequently Asked Questions on Ethics, AM. MED. ASS'N, https://www.ama-assn.org/
about/publications-newsletters/frequently-asked-questions-ethics (last visited Aug. 17,
2019). These standards vary from state to state. Id.
78. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270-72 (2006) (explaining that while Congress
could create, and thereby define, federal mandatory standards of care for physicians, section
903 of the CSA indicates that it has chosen to leave such standards to the states).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Sabean, 885 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Singh, 54
F.3d at 1187; United States v. August, 984 F.2d 705, 713 (6th Cir. 1992)).
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whether a physician acted without a "legitimate medical purpose,"
and, therefore, outside of the usual course of professional conduct:
[t]here is no pat formula describing what proof is required to
ground a finding that a defendant acted outside the usual
course of professional practice .... Rather, inquiring courts
must approach the issue on a case-by-case basis .... In con-
ducting this tamisage, testimony from a medical or pharmaco-
logical expert may be helpful - but such expert testimony is
not a sine qua non to a finding of guilt .... [In drawing their
conclusions, jurors] may draw on their everyday experiences,
and they can be expected to have some familiarity with how
doctors care for patients.
80
The court's analysis, and the idea of presenting this issue to the
jury without a clear guiding standard that defines an action that is
not done for a "legitimate medical purpose," is flawed for two rea-
sons.
First, members of the jury, who possess no medical expertise, can-
not be expected to make judgements on the legitimacy of complex
medical practice without a supplementary expert testimony re-
quirement.81 Second, issues of quality physician care cannot real-
istically be litigated with uniformity when physician care proce-
dures vary so dramatically between physicians' offices. Such vari-
ances in care procedures inevitably leads to varying opinions in the
minds of patients, and in turn, jurors, as to the appearance of qual-
ity physician care. For example, a physician from a small-town do-
ing business out of a small-volume office may be intimately familiar
with the patients that physician sees, whereas a physician from a
large city doing business out of a booming practice may not be ac-
quainted, personally, with each patient. The level at which physi-
cian and patient are acquainted will likely affect the physician's un-
derstanding of the patient's condition, in turn affecting the "check-
up" procedures the physician performs, thereby affecting the pa-
tient's (and potential juror's) perception of "normal" medical proce-
dure. With this in mind, consider the effect such a lack of uni-
formity may have on decisions rendered by ninety-four different
80. Sabean, 885 F.3d at 46-47 (citing Singh, 54 F.3d at 1187; August, 984 F.2d at 713;
United States v. Elder, 682 F.3d 1065, 1070 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Pellmann, 668
F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2012)).
81. The need for using expert testimony to describe prescribing practices typically taken
for an illegitimate purpose would be alleviated in most cases if the solution suggested below
was implemented, as the courts would have the trademark signs of such actions at their
disposal and could use them to instruct juries.
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federal district courts: will decisions rendered by a jury relating to
the legitimacy of an opioid prescription following a cursory-like
evaluation be analyzed in the same fashion by juries in the United
States District Court for the District of Montana as they will be in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York? Because of the probable differences in examination expecta-
tions between patients from Montana and New York, the lack of
uniformity provides a likely source for inconsistent and misguided
decisions and demands Congress to act by taking steps to ensure
the creation of a guiding standard.
IV. ILLEGITIMATE MEDICAL PURPOSE
Defining "legitimate medical purpose" risks setting a nationwide
medical standard of care, which would intrude into the medical pro-
fession; hence, Congress has forgone such a task.82 Congress, how-
ever, could vest authority to clearly define "illegitimate medical pur-
pose" in an expert agency without causing the same effect. A con-
cept such as "illegitimate medical purpose" would provide guide-
lines for: (1) physicians when prescribing opioids; (2) prosecutors
when determining whether a physician's prescribing practices con-
stitute a suspicious practice worthy of prosecution; and (3) courts
when determining whether the physician's prescribing practices
were conducted for a reason other than a "legitimate medical pur-
pose." The DEA, as the agency designated by Congress to enforce
and investigate large-scale drug crimes, has repeatedly deemed sev-
eral activities to have been conducted for "illegitimate medical pur-
poses." There are also multiple court decisions discussing such il-
legitimate prescribing practices, which the DEA and prosecutors
consider to be "red flags."83 Thus, because these "red flags" are tra-
ditionally determinative findings that a physician acted for an ille-
gitimate purpose, these "red flags" justify and could provide the
skeleton for such a regulation.
In 1978, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in United States v. Rosen provided a list of eight indicators that
demonstrated a physician prescribed a controlled substance for an
82. See Hoffmann, supra note 8, at 257 (noting that congressional invasion into the med-
ical profession is a factor that "appears to prevent rational exploration of the issue and coop-
erative means of dealing with the problem").
83. See id. at 278 (noting that commission of a "red flag' has been deemed by the DEA
and prosecutors to be evidence of a physician's guilt because a reasonable physician would
have known that such action serves no legitimate medical purpose); see also infra notes 85-
86.
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"illegitimate medical purpose."84 Over time, these eight indicators
have been consistently articulated by the courts as common "red
flags" of illegitimate prescribing practices, and have been advanced
by prosecutors as prima facie evidence of a physician's guilt. 85
These factors are not all-inclusive.8 Instead, they, when presented
together with recently reoccurring illegitimate acts by physicians,
provide a uniform, yet flexible framework for determining whether
an act was committed for an "illegitimate medical purpose."
To enforce such a framework, Congress should elect to define "il-
legitimate medical purpose" by vesting the DEA with authority to
supplement section 841 through a supporting regulation. As the
CSA's expert agency, the DEA focuses on investigating and prepar-
ing for the prosecution of violating physicians. Thus, its keen
awareness of the factors that contribute to the decision to institute
a physician prosecution would aid it in crafting this regulation.
Such a regulation should rely on the precedent-derived "indicators"
84. 582 F.2d 1032, 1035-36 (5th Cir. 1978).
85. The eight indicators, which support the inference that a prescription was written for
an illegitimate medical purpose, include:
1. Prescribing excessively large amounts of opioids, see United States v. Joseph, 709
F.3d 1082, 1104 (11th Cir. 2013);
2. Failure to perform a physical examination or diagnostic testing, or performing
only minimal examination or diagnostic testing, on patients, see United States v. Mer-
rill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2008);
3. Physician instructions that prescriptions should be filled at different pharmacies
to avoid detection and ensure prescriptions were filled, see United States v. Hooker,
541 F.2d 300, 304 (1st Cir. 1976);
4. Continuing to prescribe opioids to patients, despite the physician's understanding
that the patients were redistributing the opioids prescribed to them, see United States
v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 474 (4th Cir. 2006);
5. Prescriptions that are repeatedly refilled early for no legitimate reason, see United
States v. Kohli, 847 F.3d 483, 490 (7th Cir. 2017);
6. A physician's use of street slang to identify the opioids prescribed, see Rosen, 582
F.2d at 1036-37;
7. Prescriptions that do not correspond, in typical medical practice, to the ailment
being complained of by the patient, such as a long-term prescription for a minor ail-
ment, see United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132, 1139 (4th Cir. 1994); and
8.Writing multiple prescriptions for overlapping treatment periods in order to "spread
out" the prescriptions, see United States v. Armstrong, 550 F.3d 382, 390 (5th Cir.
2008).
86. More recently, the DEA has consistently identified, and the courts have relied upon,
other indicators that a prescription was written for an illegitimate medical purpose, includ-
ing:
1. Pre-signed prescriptions, see United States v. Evans, 892 F.3d 692, 718 (5th Cir.
2018);
2. Unconventional methods of payment for prescriptions, see United States v.
McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 553 (4th Cir. 2006) (cash exchanged for prescriptions); Tran
Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d at 1134 (repair services exchanged for prescriptions); and
3. Unusual physician office patterns, see United States v. Crittenden, 716 F. App'x
142, 145 (4th Cir. 2017) (excessively high patient volume for a relatively small office);
United States v. Green, 818 F.3d 1258, 1276 (1lth Cir. 2016) (patients traveling long
distances to get to the physician's office).
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of illegitimate prescribing by physicians and should address the fol-
lowing:
1. Whether the ailment complained of justified the amount
of medication prescribed?
2. Whether a physical exam or diagnostic test was performed
prior to prescription, and if so, how thorough was the exam or
test performed?
3. Whether the physician instructed the patient to fill the
prescription at different pharmacies?
4. Whether any signs indicated to the physician that the pa-
tient was addicted to or redistributing the medication pre-
scribed?
5. Whether the physician repeatedly allowed the medication
prescribed to be refilled early?
6. Whether the medication prescribed was reasonably re-
lated to the ailment complained of?
7. Whether multiple prescriptions were written following a
single appointment?
8. Whether the prescriptions were filled out by the physician
prior to the appointment?
9. Whether the physician accepted unconventional payment
methods?
10. Whether the physician's office displayed conditions un-
characteristic to such an office given the office's size, amount
of employees, and location?
Such a regulation would serve multiple purposes. First, the
framework itself would educate physicians as to which prescribing
practices to avoid due to the risk of investigation and prosecution.
Second, the framework would aid prosecutors in making a precise
determination as to which physicians to pursue and prosecute.
Third, the framework would provide the courts with set standards
such that they can analyze cases involving section 841 with uni-
formity, regardless of the varying facts and circumstances. Fourth,
the framework would allow jurors to make a determination as to
the validity of a physician's prescribing practices without medical
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expertise. By serving these purposes, the regulation would also al-
low the Trump Administration to accomplish its aggressive ap-
proach toward cutting off the illicit supply of opioids in an efficient
manner that maintains respect for physicians' expertise.
CONCLUSION
To combat our country's growing drug problem, President Trump
is enforcing a new and aggressive approach to decrease the amount
of illegal opioids diverted to the streets, which entails DOJ prosecu-
tions of physicians who criminally overprescribe prescription opi-
oids. Such a tactic has drawn comparisons to, and increasingly re-
sembles, prosecutions of street-drug dealers. As a result, this has
led to greater scrutiny on, and increased prosecutions for, physi-
clans' prescribing practices. While any newly implemented ap-
proach will undoubtedly be accompanied by positive and negative
effects, as it stands, the negative effects of Trump's aggressive ap-
proach will likely outweigh the positive effects because "legitimate
medical purpose," as used in the CSA, is undefined by regulation or
precedent and is thus subject to different interpretations amongst
physicians, prosecutors, and courts. Lack of guidance guarantees
inconsistent results in physician prosecutions because jurors, who
possess little to no medical expertise, are placed in the impossible
position of having to determine the validity of a medical profes-
sional's prescribing practices. As such, it is imperative that Con-
gress act, by vesting the DEA with authority to promulgate a regu-
lation necessary to clarify prescribing practices that are tradition-
ally conducted for an "illegitimate medical purpose." Such a regu-
lation would serve to educate physicians, prosecutors, and courts
and could also provide guidance for jurors, thereby allowing for
greater precision in determining which prosecutions of overpre-
scribing physicians have merit. Ultimately, this regulation would
allow the Trump Administration to strike a middle ground by both
achieving its desired outcome of cracking down on corrupt physi-
clans while ensuring physicians are safe from misguided prosecu-
tion.
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